Senator Calls for Increased U.S. Surveillance of Chinese Companies

Ten years ago, most Americans had never heard of Huawei. Today, the Chinese telecom powerhouse is a case study in how quickly a state‑backed firm can dominate a strategic technology sector, creating both market disruption and national‑security concerns for the United States.

Senator Mark Warner, the top Democrat on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, warned that another Chinese company could eclipse Huawei’s impact—this time not by building 5G infrastructure, but by amassing DNA data on a global scale. The firm in question is BGI, one of the world’s largest genomics companies.

“If Huawei was big, BGI will be even bigger,” Warner told attendees at the CNBC CFO Council Summit in Washington, D.C.

BGI operates state‑of‑the‑art DNA‑sequencing laboratories in China and overseas, providing genetic‑analysis services to hospitals, pharmaceutical companies, and research institutions in dozens of countries. Originating as the Beijing Genomics Institute, the company was intimately tied to China’s national genome projects before expanding into a commercial enterprise that now offers prenatal testing, cancer screening, and large‑scale population‑genetics studies.

Through a network of subsidiaries, BGI maintains facilities in the United States, Europe, and Japan, and has helped build national genetic databases and pandemic‑testing platforms in several jurisdictions.

U.S. intelligence officials argue that BGI’s global footprint gives it access to one of the planet’s largest repositories of genetic data. At scale, DNA information becomes a strategic asset that can fuel a “DNA arms race” – a term coined by analysts who note that genetic profiles reveal ancestry, physical traits, disease risk, family relationships, and, when combined with artificial intelligence, the potential for mass surveillance and long‑term biological research tied to national security.

Warner emphasized the urgency of the issue at the CNBC event: “They are hoovering up DNA data. This level of experimentation on humans and intellectual‑property theft should concern us all.”

Congressional investigators have previously documented BGI’s close ties to the Chinese Communist Party and the People’s Liberation Army, warning that China often blurs the line between commercial data collection and state security requirements.

One of the most unsettling scenarios linked to BGI’s data‑gathering capabilities is the prospect of a genetically enhanced soldier. U.S. defense analysts claim that Chinese research programs span population‑wide DNA collection, military‑focused biometric databases, and AI‑driven models for human performance optimization. Such efforts, they argue, could eventually translate into bio‑engineered troops with enhanced endurance, cognition, or disease resistance.

Warner echoed these concerns, describing the prospect as “terrifying.”

Warner, a former telecom executive who helped found Nextel, drew a parallel between Huawei’s rise and BGI’s trajectory. “Go back eight or nine years, and most people had never heard of Huawei,” he said. “Huawei combined massive state support, aggressive pricing and global market access, outcompeting Western firms and embedding itself in the world’s telecom backbone before governments grasped the security implications.”

When the U.S. placed Huawei on a trade blacklist in 2019, the country began to lose ground in 5G infrastructure—a loss that Warner believes was partly due to the lag in policy response. “By the time we moved to restrict Huawei, we had already let a substantial portion of the 5G backbone become Chinese‑sourced,” he noted.

Republican House Committee Chairman John Moolenaar warned that Chinese firms continue to leverage excess capacity and price manipulation to drive competitors out of business across multiple technology sectors. Warner added that the competition is no longer limited to telecom; China is now a formidable challenger in AI, quantum computing, and biotechnology.

BGI’s rapid scaling mirrors Huawei’s playbook: heavy state financing, export of cheap yet sophisticated technology, and strategic placement of its solutions in critical infrastructure worldwide. Think tanks such as the Foundation for Defense of Democracies have called on bipartisan lawmakers to curtail BGI’s access to U.S. institutions, urging the passage of the “BIOSECURE Act” that would restrict Chinese biotech firms from operating on American soil.

Hospital and research‑institution partnerships with Chinese genomics firms have already come under federal pressure, creating a tension between national‑security objectives and the potential loss of cutting‑edge scientific collaboration. BGI has publicly denied any wrongdoing, asserting that it complies with all regulations and does not have access to personal data of Americans.

Warner argues that U.S. intelligence agencies have been too slow to recognize the biotech threat. Historically focused on foreign militaries and governments, the agencies have under‑invested in tracking commercial technology sectors where strategic advantages can emerge. In the past two to three years, there has been a modest shift toward monitoring AI, semiconductors, and biotechnology, but Warner says the effort remains “far behind the curve.”

A recent surprise came when China’s semiconductor champion SMIC produced a six‑nanometer chip despite sweeping U.S. export controls, revealing the limits of Washington’s current containment strategy. “We got caught off guard with the SMIC six‑nanometer chip,” Warner said, underscoring the need for a more proactive, technology‑focused intelligence posture.

The senator also highlighted the erosion of traditional intelligence‑sharing arrangements, such as the Five Eyes network, which have been strained under the previous administration. Partners in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and France have expressed reluctance to share intelligence that they perceive as being politicized, further weakening the U.S. ability to monitor China’s rapid advances.

Beyond espionage, the United States faces a competition of standards‑setting. For decades, American leadership in wireless, satellite and internet protocols has translated into market dominance. Today, China is aggressively positioning itself as the global rule‑maker across emerging domains, from 6G to synthetic biology. Warner warned that losing influence in international standards bodies could lock U.S. firms out of future markets and cede ethical control over powerful technologies.

“Will it be us or the Chinese?” he asked. “The Chinese approach is often less human‑centric. They flood standards committees with engineers and, in many cases, buy influence. We need to re‑engage, not just to protect our businesses but to ensure that the global technology ecosystem reflects democratic values.”