Ocean Floor Race: Securing the Depths

Nations and corporations are increasingly recognizing that the future of global security and economic stability is not confined to the skies, but extends crucially to the ocean floor. A significant influx of capital and strategic focus is being directed towards developing advanced technologies for underwater applications, driven by mounting concerns over the vulnerability of vital infrastructure such as global connectivity cables and energy pipelines traversing the seabed.

This heightened attention coincides with growing anxieties surrounding “hybrid warfare,” a multifaceted threat that encompasses cyberattacks, energy sabotage, disinformation campaigns, and economic coercion, often deployed with or without the accompaniment of conventional military actions.

“The evolving threat landscape has undeniably brought these critical issues to the forefront,” observed Katja Bego, a senior research fellow at Chatham House.

Simultaneously, rapid advancements in artificial intelligence, drone technology, and autonomous systems are paving the way for novel and sophisticated approaches to underwater surveillance and defense.

From the deployment of autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) to the integration of advanced sensors on subsea cables, governments and military alliances are actively exploring enhanced methods to monitor the intricate network of infrastructure that underpins the global economy.

“Our entire economic system is built upon this subsea foundation,” Bego emphasized.

The September 2022 explosions that ruptured the Nord Stream gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea served as a stark reminder of these vulnerabilities. Investigations concluded that the pipelines, designed to transport natural gas from Russia to Germany, had been deliberately sabotaged. This incident, alongside damage to subsea infrastructure in other strategically sensitive regions like the Arctic and near Taiwan, has galvanized governments’ attention to critical undersea assets that had received comparatively little focus in the decades following the Cold War.

“This domain has been neglected for quite some time, necessitating a substantial effort to catch up,” Bego noted.

As of early 2026, over 1.5 million kilometers of submarine communication cables are in operation worldwide, according to TeleGeography, a leading telecommunications research firm that meticulously tracks global subsea cable networks.

Beyond telecommunications, a growing network of subsea power cables is increasingly connecting electricity markets and transmitting power from offshore wind farms to terrestrial grids. This expanding infrastructure adds another layer of criticality to the underwater domain.

The widespread and transformative deployment of aerial drones during the conflict in Ukraine has vividly demonstrated how autonomous systems, operated remotely, can fundamentally alter the nature of warfare. In this context, Bego aptly describes the maritime environment as “the next logical domain” for strategic competition and defense.

Defense industry leaders are now strategically positioning themselves to capitalize on this paradigm shift.

Italian shipbuilding giant Fincantieri, for instance, announced in July its plans to acquire majority stakes in four companies for approximately 600 million euros ($689 million). This strategic move aims to bolster its capabilities across underwater and surface drones, marine surveying, and subsea communications.

Building upon over a century of submarine expertise, Fincantieri is transitioning from what its CEO, Pierroberto Folgiero, terms the “conventional underwater” world into an “unconventional” one, encompassing advanced unmanned systems and subsea telecommunications. Folgiero articulated to CNBC in July that underwater telecommunications represent “the real enabler of this new ecosystem.”

Folgiero envisions future surface vessels serving as sophisticated “motherships,” orchestrating networks of autonomous vehicles operating both above and within the water column.

Fincantieri is not an isolated case. Major defense conglomerates, including France’s Thales, have well-established divisions dedicated to sonar, anti-submarine warfare, mine detection, and autonomous underwater systems. This indicates a broad industry recognition of the emerging market for operations beneath the ocean’s surface, attracting both large and small enterprises.

Germany-based defense-tech company Euroatlas is another significant player targeting the potentially lucrative market of seabed defense.

The company has developed the GrayShark, an autonomous underwater vehicle capable of independently navigating to designated areas and executing missions without continuous human oversight, according to Verineia Codrean, Euroatlas’s chief strategy and partnerships officer.

The GrayShark is engineered to detect and avoid obstacles, and to follow pre-programmed instructions when encountering unforeseen circumstances. For example, during a pipeline inspection, it could identify a mine-like object, report its findings, and await operator authorization for further investigation.

Codrean envisions a future where, rather than relying on costly warships to patrol every kilometer of subsea cable, fleets of autonomous vehicles would continuously monitor strategic seabed zones, converging and responding to any detected anomalies.

“It is virtually impossible to cover the entire ocean,” Codrean told CNBC, emphasizing the strategic importance of maintaining constant visibility in key areas.

She argued that this challenge is fundamentally one of scale; crewed assets like frigates, submarines, and maritime patrol aircraft are prohibitively expensive and scarce for maintaining a continuous presence across the vast expanses where critical cables, pipelines, and other strategic assets are located.

“The underwater space domain is grappling with an increasing set of problems that were not present until now,” she stated, adding that “from a mathematical perspective, [crewed assets] cannot be everywhere and anywhere these problems are emerging, whether it’s sabotage or enemy submarine activity.”

The development of autonomous vehicles is not solely focused on infrastructure surveillance. In addition to anti-submarine warfare, which traditionally involves submarines targeting other crewed submarines, Codrean highlighted the emergence of “anti-AUV” missions. These operations are specifically designed to detect, track, and identify autonomous and unmanned underwater vehicles operated by adversary nations.

“What we are building, so are our non-allies or our enemies building as well,” she pointed out.

“Because others are also developing autonomous underwater vehicles, you need to be able to classify which are from… NATO-friendly countries or allies, and which are not from friendly countries,” Codrean explained. This dynamic raises the prospect of increased machine-on-machine engagements beneath the ocean surface.

However, Codrean does not foresee autonomous vehicles entirely replacing conventional submarines and warships. “I wouldn’t be so deterministic as to say drones versus drones only, but for sure a much more increased activity from drones against drones until you need a manned asset to step in as well,” she cautioned.

Instead, she anticipates navies will increasingly adopt a hybrid approach, integrating crewed and autonomous systems, thereby elevating the importance of interoperability between them.

While Fincantieri’s Folgiero identified underwater telecommunications as a key enabler for the emerging underwater domain, Codrean suggests that advances in acoustic and other subsea communication technologies are making range and endurance the primary bottlenecks.

Euroatlas is also developing a hydrogen fuel-cell variant of the GrayShark, designed for extended underwater operations of up to 16 weeks or 8,000 nautical miles, though the company has yet to publicly demonstrate this full endurance capability underwater.

Euroatlas has secured over 100 million euros in GrayShark contracts with undisclosed European navies. Codrean clarified that the vehicles are currently unarmed, with their primary missions focusing on surveillance, detection, and deterrence.

Despite significant investments and technological progress, a fundamental challenge persists: the sheer impossibility of realistically protecting every kilometer of subsea infrastructure.

“I don’t think anyone, listening to NATO officials, would pretend that [we] can protect a network of a million kilometers plus,” Bego stated, underscoring the vastness of the task.

Furthermore, the lines of responsibility for safeguarding this critical infrastructure remain blurred. A significant portion of the world’s subsea assets are privately owned and operated, traditionally managed by private entities for routine maintenance and repairs of accidental damage. However, protecting these assets against deliberate interference or potential wartime scenarios increasingly necessitates the involvement of governments and military forces.

Governments are actively pushing for enhanced security measures, according to Bego, which could range from intensified monitoring and the deployment of advanced sensors to deeper cable burial. However, implementing such measures can be exceptionally costly, raising critical questions about funding responsibilities and ultimate accountability.

Consequently, Bego predicts that a far more collaborative approach between governments and infrastructure owners will be imperative, moving beyond mere regulatory frameworks.

The significant investment opportunities are drawing attention from companies on both sides of the Atlantic. Concurrently, Bego noted that Russia and China are also making substantial investments in developing their underwater capabilities.

“There’s clearly a lot more money available because of it, because there’s just this massive boom in investing in drones,” she observed.

However, operating autonomously underwater presents considerably greater challenges than in the aerial domain. Poor visibility, difficult communication pathways, and the distinct behavior of signals underwater pose significant hurdles.

“This is not technology that’s anywhere near the level of the drones we see in Ukraine,” Bego cautioned.

“Progress is being made, but it’s just very difficult,” she added. “Technical hurdles are really quite significant.”

For these reasons, Bego advises against viewing autonomous underwater vehicles as a singular technological panacea for seabed security.

“It’s helpful,” she concluded. “It’s mostly about deterrence and signaling. It’s good to develop into this field of things. It’s not a panacea that’s going to fix it.”